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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA") 1 was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against
false, misleading and deceptive business practices, unconscionable
actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection."' 2 Two sets of amendments were
enacted in 2001 by the 77th Texas Legislature. One set was effective Sep-
tember 1, 2001 and the other set will be effective June 1, 2002. Effective
September 1, 2001, DTPA section 17.46 has been amended include a new
laundry list violation. Section 17.46(b)(18) now provides that the term
"false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices ' 3 also includes "advertis-
ing, selling, or distributing a card which purports to be a prescription drug
identification card issued under Section 19A, Article 21.07-6, Insurance
Code, in accordance with rules adopted by the commissioner of insur-
ance, which offers a discount on the purchase of health care goods or
services from a third party provider, and which is not evidence of insur-
ance coverage."'4 This provision contains an exception. Such activity
does not constitute a violation of the DTPA if "(A) the discount is au-
thorized under an agreement between the seller of the card and the pro-
vider of those goods and services or the discount or card is offered to
members of the seller; (B) the seller does not represent that the card
provides insurance coverage of any kind; and (C) the discount is not false,
misleading, or deceptive."'5 Because of the addition of this particular
laundry list violation, it should be noted that the numbering for the other
violations that follow section 17.46(b)(18) has shifted slightly.
Additionally, the Legislature added section 17.46(b)(26), effective June
1, 2002. New section 17.46(b)(26) provides that "selling, offering to sell,
or illegally promoting an annuity contract under Chapter 22, Acts of the
57th Legislature, 3rd Called Session, 1962 (Article 6228a-5, Vernon's
Texas Civil Statues), with the intent that the annuity contract will be the
subject of a salary reduction agreement, as defined by that Act, if the
annuity contract is not an eligible qualified investment under that Act,"
constitutes a deceptive trade practice.6
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 2002) [hereinafter
"DTPA"].
2. Id. § 17.44(a).
3. Id. § 17.46(b).
4. Id. § 17.46(b)(18).
5. Id.
6. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.46(b)(26).
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In connection with the addition of section 17.46(b)(26), the Legislature
also amended section 17.49, concerning exemptions, adding section
17.49(c)(5), which provides that the exemption for claims based on the
rendering of a professional service does not apply to a violation of section
17.26(b)(26), and adding section 17.49(h), which provides that "[a] per-
son who violates Section 17.46(b)(26) is jointly and severally liable under
that subdivision for actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees. Sub-
ject to Chapter 41, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, exemplary dam-
ages may be awarded in the event of fraud or malice."'7 So far, there are
no reported decisions addressing these changes to the Texas DTPA
statutes.
In addition to the foregoing legislative changes, this Survey covers sig-
nificant developments in the case law applying the DTPA from October
1, 2000 through September 30, 2001. Noteworthy decisions during the
Survey period address consumer status and defenses to DTPA claims.
II. CONSUMER STATUS
Many of the more interesting decisions during the Survey period in-
volved the requirement that the plaintiff be a "consumer" as that term is
defined in the statute.8 To qualify as a consumer, the plaintiff must be an
individual "who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or ser-
vices."9 Further, those goods or services must form the basis of the plain-
tiff's complaint.10 Whether a plaintiff qualifies for DTPA consumer
status is a question of law.11
A. THE PLAINTIFF'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE TRANSACTION
One statutory issue when determining consumer status is whether the
plaintiff sought or acquired "any goods or services .... ,112 Additionally,
consumer status under the DTPA frequently depends upon a showing
that the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction entitles it to relief.
13
During the Survey period several cases turned on this issue.
In Canfield v. Bank One, Texas, N.A., 14 the Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals held that the plaintiff was not a consumer under the DTPA, and
held that summary judgment was appropriate on the plaintiff's DTPA
7. Id. § 17.49(h).
8. Id. § 17.50.
9. Id. § 17.45(4).
10. Id.; Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex. 1987).
11. Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
12. DTPA § 17.45(4).
13. Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 649-50 (Tex. 1996); see
Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "DTPA
claim requires an underlying consumer transaction; there must be a nexus between the
consumer, the transaction, and the defendant's conduct") (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at
650).
14. 51 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
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claims.15 Canfield sued his bank to recover for wrongfully paid items,
including forged checks and cashed-out certificates of deposit. 16 On ap-
peal by the plaintiff, the Texarkana Court of Appeals found that the
bank's payment of forged checks did not constitute a violation of the
DTPA17 and that Canfield was not a consumer for purposes of the DTPA
when he purchased the certificates of deposit. 18
The court first noted that money is not a type of "goods" or "tangible
chattel" as defined by the DTPA.19 The court further stated that "the
mere purchase of a certificate of deposit does not confer consumer status
under the DTPA," although "the purchase of financial counseling ser-
vices, collateral to the purchase of a certificate of deposit, can confer con-
sumer status. '20 Because Canfield did not "contend that he sought or
acquired any ancillary services in the purchase of the certificates of de-
posit, nor [did] he contend that the bank provided any other services that
would provide a basis for a DTPA claim," Canfield was not a consumer
under the DTPA in relation to the certificates of deposit.2 '
Jones v. Star Houston, Inc.22 involved a car owner who sued his dealer-
ship for breach of contract, negligence, and DTPA violations. Jones al-
leged that his car was damaged while it was being repaired. The
dealership contended that there was no evidence to establish Jones's con-
sumer status under the DTPA.23 The dealership first argued that "be-
cause Jones was seeking repairs under a warranty that obligated [the
dealership] to repair the vehicle without compensation, [Jones] was pre-
cluded from obtaining consumer status. '24 The Houston Court of Ap-
peals noted that the dealership's argument was counter to established
law, because "one does not have to pay for goods or services to be a
consumer under the [DTPA]. ''25 Thus, "Jones satisfied the first part of
the consumer status inquiry."'26
The court next determined whether the repairs Jones sought formed
the basis of his complaint.27 Jones argued that he took his car in for re-
pair work, that his car was damaged in the course of the repair work, and
that he therefore should be able to pursue a DTPA claim.28 The dealer-
ship countered that any damage to Jones's car occurred before the dealer-
15. Id. at 840.
16. Id. at 832.
17. Id. at 838.
18. Id. at 839.
19. Canfield, 51 S.W.3d at 838 (citing Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169,
174 (Tex. 1980)).
20. Id. at 839 (citing Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 483, 500 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).
21. Id. at 839-40.
22. 45 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).





28. Jones, 45 S.W.3d at 356.
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ship performed the repairs, that it immediately informed Jones of the
damage to the car and took steps to remedy the damage, and that Jones
prevented it from performing its contractual service work by demanding
that the dealership cease all work related to his car.29 The court held that
"the relevant inquiry was whether the damage to Jones's car occurred
while [the dealership] was attempting to make the requested repair."'30
Because there was evidence that the car was damaged during the servic-
ing at the dealership, the court concluded that the dealership had failed to
carry its burden to show that Jones was not a consumer as a matter of
law.31
Another case involving consumer status was decided by the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals. In Ford v. City State Bank of Palacios,32 a
debtor brought lender liability, breach of contract, and promissory estop-
pel claims against his creditor, and the creditor counterclaimed for
amounts due under three promissory notes. In its motion for summary
judgment, the creditor asserted that the debtor lacked consumer status
under the DTPA, and therefore could not recover on his DTPA claims as
a matter of law.33 The Corpus Christi court recognized that, "[glenerally,
a pure loan transaction lies outside the DTPA because money is consid-
ered to be neither a good nor a service."'34 However, a creditor may be
inextricably intertwined in a transaction so as to confer consumer status
on a party if, from the buyer's perspective, the extension of credit forms
the means of making the sale or purchase of goods. 35
The court also observed that the DTPA does not impose vicarious lia-
bility based on innocent involvement with business transactions, and that
to hold a creditor liable in a consumer credit transaction, the creditor
must be shown to have some connection with either the actual sales trans-
action or with a deceptive act related to financing the transaction. 36
In this case, the debtor wanted a portion of the loan proceeds to
purchase cattle.37 He argued that he was a consumer because he sought
to acquire goods. He did not, however, allege that the creditor had any
connection with the sale of the cattle, nor did he allege that the creditor
committed any deceptive act related to the initial financing of the
purchase transaction.38 Instead, he alleged that the creditor "engaged in
post-sale misrepresentations regarding the possibility of renewing and ex-
tending" the note.39 The court stated that "although the [creditor's] al-
29. Id. at 356-57.
30. Id. at 357.
31. Id.
32. 44 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
33. Id. at 133.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 134 (citing Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Salinas, 999 S.W.2d 846, 854 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied)).
36. Id. at 134 (citing Home Savings Ass'n v. Guerra, 733 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1987)).





legedly unconscionable course of action occurred after the purchase of
the goods," this did not "automatically exempt them from liability under
the DTPA. ''4 0 However, because the cattle bought by the debtor were
not the basis of his complaint, the second prong of the definition of con-
sumer status had not been met.41 Thus, the court held that the debtor
was not a consumer under the DTPA.42
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. Partner-
ship,43 JMB, the purchaser of an office building, brought an action against
PPG Industries, a window manufacturer, alleging breach of warranty and
DTPA violations. JMB bought the building from Houston Center Corp.
in December 1989. In July 1994, after many of the windows had fogged
up and discolored, JMB sued PPG. The jury found in JMB's favor on
both its DTPA and breach of warranty claims."a
On appeal PPG contended that a 1983 amendment to the DTPA defini-
tion of "consumer," whether retroactive or prospective in its application,
extinguished JMB's DTPA claim. In 1983, the definition of "consumer"
under the DTPA was amended to exclude business consumers with assets
of $25 million or more.45 Because JMB has assets in excess of $25 mil-
lion, it was not itself a consumer.46 PPG claimed that because the 1983
amendment had no savings clause, the amendment was immediately ef-
fective, and had extinguished Houston Center Corp.'s status as a con-
sumer because at that time it had assets in excess of $25 million.47 PPG
argued that because JMB's predecessor, Houston Center Corp., could not
bring a DTPA claim against PPG in 1989 when it sold the building, JMB
could not acquire any such claim by assignment. 48 The Houston Court of
Appeals found that the DTPA section defining business consumers had
no retrospective application and did not preclude Houston Center Corp.
from maintaining its DTPA action against PPG.4 9
PPG contended in the alternative "that since the sale between Houston
Center Corp. and JMB occurred in 1989, the 1983 amendment effectively
denied consumer status to JMB." 5° The court found, however, that JMB
was not asserting its own claim, but one it obtained by assignment. 51 Be-
cause the court looked to the status of the assignor, JMB did not have to
be a consumer in its own right.5 2
In Burnap v. Linnartz,53 Burnap, a partner who was liable on a dis-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Ford, 44 S.W.3d at 135.
43. 41 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
44. Id. at 274.
45. Id. at 277.
46. Id. at 278.
47. Id.
48. PPG Indus., 41 S.W.3d at 278.




53. 38 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
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solved partnership's promissory note, brought an action against the part-
nership's attorney, his law firm, as well as the associate of another firm, to
recover for legal malpractice, violations of the DTPA, and negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress in connection with the drafting of docu-
ments for withdrawal of the partners and an agreement to indemnify the
partners from their obligation on the note.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, disagreed with Lin-
nartz and the Linnartz Firm's contention that they were entitled to sum-
mary judgment on Burnap's DTPA claims on the ground that Burnap was
not a consumer in relation to the legal services provided in connection
with the releases. 54 Linnartz and the Linnartz firm had argued that Bur-
nap was not a consumer of the legal services, because he did not engage
or pay the lawyer or the law firm for their services, nor was the primary
purpose of the agreement for his benefit.55 The court observed that the
dispositive issue was whether Burnap was a beneficiary of the legal ser-
vices provided-not whether Burnap was the actual purchaser of the le-
gal services. 56 The court found that "Burnap's affidavit rais[ed] a genuine
issue of material fact as to his status as a beneficiary because it assert[ed]
the existence of an attorney-client relationship. '57
The lawyer and his law firm also contended that Burnap could not es-
tablish he was a consumer as to the legal services because another firm's
associate performed some of the services and the lawyer and his firm
could not be held derivatively liable for the other lawyer's acts. 58 Again,
the court disagreed, holding that Burnap's consumer status must be de-
termined by his relationship to the transaction, not to a particular defen-
dant, and that Burnap's consumer status did not turn upon whether the
lawyer and his firm could be held derivatively liable for the other lawyer's
conduct in negotiating and drafting the release. 59 Because lack of con-
sumer status was not conclusively established by the summary judgment
record, the court held that lack of consumer status could not support the
trial court's summary judgment against Burnap on his DTPA claims.60
In another case involving consumer status, Anton v. Merrill Lynch,61 an
investor's surviving spouse sued Merrill Lynch and one of its investment
advisors, alleging that they had committed violations of the DTPA when
they complied with her husband's request to remove her as a death bene-
ficiary of her husband's individual retirement account in favor of his sur-
viving children without informing her.
Merrill Lynch "moved for summary judgment on the basis that Anton
54. Id. at 618-19.
55. Id. at 620.
56. Id. (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 815
(Tex. 1997)).
57. Id.
58. Burnap, 38 S.W.3d at 621.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 36 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied).
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was not a consumer with respect to the IRA funds."' 62 The Austin Court
of Appeals found that Anton was not a consumer of her husband's IRA
while she was designated its beneficiary. 63 "The undisputed evidence
was that [the husband] was the only person involved in the establishment
of the IRA or the designation of death beneficiaries, and that he was the
only person with contractual authority to direct [Merrill Lynch and its
investment advisor] regarding the investment and disbursement of the
IRA funds."'64 The court also held that Anton's "alleged community and
separate property interest in some of the funds [did] not make her a con-
sumer with respect to the IRA," because "the only evidence [was that the
husband] alone established the IRA," and "there was no evidence that
[Anton] had anything to do with seeking or acquiring the services inci-
dent to the establishment or maintenance of the IRA. ''65
Finally the court held that Anton's consumer status with respect to her
own accounts could not give her a DTPA cause of action for Merrill
Lynch's alleged failure to inform her that she had been removed as the
beneficiary of her husband's IRA. 66 "The funds at the center of her claim
(the IRA) are not the funds or services for which she contracted (her
accounts)." 67 Thus, to prevail on her theory, she must have been a con-
sumer as to the IRA.68 Because Anton was not a DTPA consumer of her
deceased husband's IRA, the Austin court held that the trial court did not
err by rendering judgment against Anton on her DTPA claims.69
B. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO CONSUMER
STATUS REQUIREMENT
In Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. BASF Corp.,70 BASF challenged the
DTPA statute on equal protection grounds as discriminating based on
wealth. Alcan, the manufacturer of aluminum-based panels for gasoline
station fascia and sun rooms, brought a state-court action against BASF, a
supplier of a urethane foam system used in producing panels. Alcan as-
serted claims for DTPA violations, as well as several other causes of ac-
tion. 7' The United States District Court found that Alcan's DTPA claim
was precluded by the clear language of the statute, which provides a
cause of action for a "consumer. '72 Alcan admitted that it was a "busi-
ness consumer" and had assets in excess of $25 million.73 The court ob-
served that a "business consumer" is specifically excluded from the
62. Id. at 258.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 260.




70. 133 F. Supp. 2d 482 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
71. Id. at 488-89.




definition of "consumer" 74 and thus despite Alcan's assertions to the con-
trary, Alcan was not a "consumer" under the plain terms of the statute
and had no cause of action under the DTPA. 75 Alcan's only argument in
opposition to the court's conclusion was that the DTPA provision exclud-
ing business consumers from coverage violated the equal protection pro-
visions of the Texas and federal constitutions. 76 The gist of Alcan's
argument, which lacked any case law or similar support, was that it was
"unfair" to allow its customers to sue and collect treble damages under
the DTPA while Alcan could not sue BASF under the DTPA. 77
The court concluded that Alcan's argument was without merit. "A
statute, challenged on equal protection grounds as discriminating based
on wealth, must be sustained if rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment interest. '78 The court reasoned that when, as here, "a statutory
provision does not burden a suspect group or a fundamental interest, the
court presumes that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest and will not overturn such a statute unless the varying
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achieve-
ment of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only con-
clude that the legislature's actions were irrational. '79
The court concluded that legitimate government purposes could sup-
port the statutory distinction. It reasoned that the wealthy, along with all
consumers, have other protections against deceptive trade practices, as
demonstrated by the plaintiff's other claims in the action, and that only
the additional protection offered by the DTPA was at issue.80 The court
disagreed with Alcan's contention that the wealthy need as much protec-
tion against deceptive trade practices as those who are not wealthy.81 Ul-
timately, the court held that "a decision not to provide the additional
DTPA protection to the wealthy [was] consistent with a rational conclu-
sion on the Legislature's part, and therefore [did] not violate the Equal
Protection Clause." 82
III. DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff also must
show that a "false, misleading, or deceptive act," breach of warranty or
unconscionable action or course of action occurred, and that such con-
duct was the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage. 83
74. Id. (citing DTPA § 17.45(4)).
75. Alcan, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468
U.S. 841, 859 n.17 (1984)).
79. Id. (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979)).
80. Alcan, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 502.
83. DTPA § 17.50(a)(1)-(3).
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A. LAUNDRY LIST CLAIMS
DTPA section 17.46(b) contains, in 24 subparts, a nonexclusive list of
actions that constitute "false, misleading or deceptive acts" under the
statute. Plaintiffs invoking these "laundry list"84 claims are generally not
required to prove or plead the defendant's state of mind or intent to
deceive. 85 Nor have plaintiffs always been required to show that they
relied on the enumerated deceptions. 86 Whether a consumer should have
to show reliance, however, remains the subject of debate.87 Several sig-
nificant cases involving "laundry list" claims were decided during the Sur-
vey period.
Last year's Survey reported on the case of Helena Chemical Co. v. Wil-
kins88 in which the defendants had argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the jury verdict against them. During this Survey
period, the Texas Supreme Court also examined whether there was any
evidence to support the jury's DTPA liability and causation findings. 89
The case involved a group of farmers who sued Helena, a seed seller,
alleging DTPA violations, breach of warranty, and fraud. The trial court
entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding damages to the farmers.
Both sides appealed. The trial court submitted two DTPA questions to
the jury: first, whether Helena had violated three DTPA laundry list pro-
visions, and second, whether Helena violated section 17.50(a)(3) (uncon-
scionable action or course of action). 90 The jury answered "yes" to both
questions, 91 and Helena argued on appeal that there was no evidence to
support the jury's answers.92 Specifically, Helena argued that any repre-
sentations made to the farmers amounted to nonactionable puffing and
that there was no causation evidence. 93 The Supreme Court agreed with
the court of appeals, which held that there was some evidence to support
the jury's answers to both questions. 94
The Supreme Court noted "that the DTPA does not mention puffing as
a defense," but that it "has recognized that mere puffing statements are
not actionable under sections 17.36(b)(5) or 17.46(b)(7). ' 95 The puffing
defense had not been extended to violations of 17.46(b)(23) (failure to
84. The earliest located reported case reference to section 17.46(b) as a "laundry list"
occurred in Mobile County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1977, writ ref'd).
85. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980). Several subsections do
explicitly involve an element of scienter. See, e.g., DTPA § 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16),
(17) & (23).
86. Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
87. See generally Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assoc., 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
88. 47 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2001).
89. Id. at 490.
90. Id. at 501.
91. Id. at 501.
92. Id.
93. Helena, 47 S.W.3d at 501.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 502 (citing Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. 1980)).
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disclose) or 17.50(a)(3) (unconscionable conduct). 96 The Supreme Court
examined the evidence that the farmers offered to support their DTPA
claims97 and found that the evidence reflected specific representations
about the seed's characteristics and specific representations about how
the crop would perform.98 The Supreme Court concluded that this con-
stituted "some evidence of misrepresentations about [the] seed's charac-
teristics, quality, and grade amounting to more than mere puffing." 99
1. § 17.46(b)(12)-Misrepresentation of Rights, Remedies or
Obligations
To maintain an action for misrepresentation under DTPA section
17.46(b)(12), a consumer must show that the defendant "represent[ed]
that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations
which it does not have or involve." 100 Plaintiffs seeking to convert a
breach of contract into a DTPA violation have frequently invoked this
provision.' 0l
In Bradford v. Vento,' 02 the Texas Supreme Court examined several
alleged laundry list violations, including section 17.46(12) of the DTPA.
The case involved several causes of action filed by Vento, the purported
buyer of a store in a shopping mall, against the seller, the mall manager,
and mall owners. The trial court entered judgment for Vento, holding all
of the defendants jointly and severally liable and awarding actual and
exemplary damages. Bradford (the mall manager) and the mall owners
appealed. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed in part and re-
versed and rendered in part, and the parties petitioned for review.
Vento contended that his claim arose out of a conversation between
Vento and Bradford when Vento paid rent due under his existing lease
and also attempted to secure a new lease for himself. During the conver-
sation, Bradford "congratulated Vento on the purchase, [and] told Vento
'not to worry' about a long-term lease until January and told Vento to
come back in January and he would 'take care of' him."'01 3 Examining
Vento's DTPA claims, the Corpus Christi court found that the only possi-
ble misrepresentation that Bradford made was that he would "take care
of" Vento in January. Vento testified that he understood this to mean he
would have to "work out" a lease in January. The court held that Brad-
ford's statement was too vague to provide a standard for the jury to use
96. Id.
97. Id. at 502-03.
98. Id.
99. Helena, 47 S.W.3d at 504.
100. DTPA § 17.46(b)(12).
101. See, e.g., Garrison Contractors, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 296, 300
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1996), affd, 966 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1998); Adler Paper Stock, Inc. v.
Houston Refuse Disposal, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 761, 764-65 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1996, writ denied); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Hometown Real Estate Co., 890
S.W.2d 118, 125 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied).
102. 48 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001).
103. Id. at 755.
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to measure the accuracy of the representation and was thus
unactionable. 0 4
2. § 17.46(b)(23)-Failure to Disclose
Section 17.46(b)(23) is perhaps the broadest "laundry list" provision, as
it permits a consumer to premise a DTPA claim on an allegation that the
defendant failed to disclose information to the consumer prior to con-
summation of the transaction. Under this section, to maintain an action
for failure to disclose a consumer must show that the defendant failed to
disclose information concerning goods or services, which was known at
the time of the transaction, and that the nondisclosure was motivated by
the intent to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the con-
sumer otherwise would not have entered. 10 5
In Steptoe v. True,10 6 the purchaser of a beach home sued her real es-
tate broker for violations of the DTPA, among other causes of action,
after her home subsided into the Gulf of Mexico. The suit arose out of
the broker's alleged misrepresentations and non-disclosures in connec-
tion with the purchase of the beach house. 10 7 "Prior to closing, a con-
crete bulkhead was on the beachfront side of the property, seaward of the
vegetation line, i.e., between the vegetation and the waterline."' 1 8 In
preparation for closing, the broker transmitted two addenda to the ear-
nest money contract-a "Coastal Property Addendum" and the "Bulk-
head Addendum." Both documents disclosed important information
about the bulkhead.' 0 9 "Essentially, the Coastal Property Addendum
disclosed that the property line on the seaward side of the house was
determined by the vegetation line. Consequently, because the vegetation
line could shift, beachfront owners are required to be informed that their
seaside property lines are subject to increases or decreases, as measured
by that vegetation line.""10 The Bulkhead Addendum contained lan-
guage disclosing that structures that become seaward of the vegetation
line as a result of natural processes are subject to a lawsuit by the State of
Texas to remove the structures.'
At some point after the purchaser had taken possession of the resi-
dence, the State of Texas notified her of its intent to remove the bulk-
head. After the bulkhead was removed, the beach continued to erode
until the house finally subsided into the Gulf of Mexico." 2
104. Id.
105. DTPA § 17.46(b)(23); see also Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907
S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tex. 1995).
106. 38 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
107. Id. at 216.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 215.
110. Id. at 215-16.
111. Steptoe, 38 S.W.3d at 216.
112. Id.
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The purchaser's DTPA claim was based on her "reliance on an alleg-
edly inadequate description of the property given to her by [the broker]
and . . . alleged misrepresentations made by him concerning the bulk-
head."'1 3 Specifically, she complained that the broker "led her to believe
that the bulkhead was a permanent structure." 14 In the alternative, she
argued that, because the broker had provided her with the Bulkhead Ad-
dendum, it could reasonably be inferred that the broker knew the bulk-
head was illegal and subject to removal by the State." 5
The trial court granted the broker's summary judgment motion, and
the purchaser appealed. The Houston Court of Appeals first noted that
the broker's liability turned on whether he was under a duty to disclose
that the bulkhead was subject to removal beyond merely giving the pur-
chaser the statutorily required addenda. 116 The court found "that, based
upon [the purchaser's] own deposition testimony, no reasonable jury
could conclude that [the broker] made any affirmative misrepresentation
... concerning the bulkhead. 11 7 According to the purchaser's own testi-
mony, the broker responded to her question about whether there was a
problem with beach erosion by stating he "didn't really know ... but in
Crystal Beach there was not." 18 Because there was nothing in the record
to suggest the broker's statement was false, and if so, whether it related to
beach erosion in Gilchrist, where the purchaser's beach house was lo-
cated, the court held that the broker's answer could not be viewed as an
affirmative misrepresentation.
The purchaser's common law husband testified to additional conversa-
tions he had with the broker. The husband testified that the broker told
him that bulkheads were a "selling feature," and that bulkheads were also
"nice to have."11 9 The court held that the broker's subjective belief that
bulkheads help sell homes could not, as a matter of law, be transformed
into an affirmative misrepresentation by the broker. It further held that,
as a matter of law, the only other statement attributative to the broker,
that bulkheads are "nice to have," likewise was not an affirmative
misrepresentation. 120
The court next examined whether the broker concealed knowledge in
light of his statement that bulkheads were "nice to have."' 121 The pur-
chaser argued there was an inference that the broker knew the bulkhead
was illegal and subject to removal based on the fact that he provided the
purchaser with the Coastal Property and Bulkhead Addenda. 22 The
court found that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the bro-
113. Id. at 216-17.
114. Id. at 217.
115. Id.




120. Id. at 217-18.




ker knew the bulkhead was going to be removed, and providing the pur-
chaser with the statutorily required addenda in no way imputed that
knowledge, primarily because neither document suggested that the State
would assert its right.123 Thus, the court held that the trial court did not
err in granting summary judgment on the purchaser's DTPA and fraud
claims. 124
3. Section 17.50-Breach of Express or Implied Warranties
Although a DTPA claim may be based upon the breach of an express
or implied warranty, the DTPA does not itself create any warranties. 125
To be actionable under the DTPA, an implied warranty must be recog-
nized by the common law or created by statute. 26 A DTPA plaintiff rais-
ing a breach of warranty claim therefore must show (1) consumer status;
(2) existence of the warranty; (3) breach of the warranty; and (4) that the
breach was a producing cause of the plaintiff's damages.127
In Codner v. Arellano, 28 a homeowner sued his subcontractor, alleging
that the subcontractor negligently poured the foundation of the home-
owner's residence and violated the DTPA by breaching an implied war-
ranty of good and workmanlike performance in the construction of the
foundation. The trial court granted a directed verdict against the home-
owner's DTPA claim that the subcontractor breached "an implied war-
ranty of good and workmanlike performance in the construction of [the
homeowner's] slab."' 129 The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed, as it
could find no case that implied a warranty of good and workmanlike per-
formance from a builder's subcontractor directly to the homeowner. 130
Because the homeowner had settled his claims against the general con-
tractor, and because the homeowner had adequate remedies to redress
the wrongs he alleged were committed by the subcontractor, the court
held that the district court did not err in refusing to submit to the jury a
question on the homeowner's theory that the subcontractor had breached
a warranty of good and workmanlike performance. 131
Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories132 involved several laundry list
claims, arising from the plaintiff's complaint that the defendant's product,
Duract, a nonsteroidial anti-inflammatory drug used for pain manage-
ment, was not what it was warranted to be-namely, a safe pain re-
123. Id.
124. Id. at 218-19.
125. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1995); see DTPA
§ 17.50(a)(2).
126. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d at 438 (citing La Sara Grain v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d
558, 565 (Tex. 1984)).
127. Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 271, 282 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
128. 40 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.).
129. Id. at 671.
130. Id. at 673.
131. Id. at 673-74.
132. 121 F. Supp. 2d 614 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
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liever.133 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas held that the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to support a claim
under section 17.50(b)(3) for a refund of the purchase price. 134 The court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's DTPA cause of
action, holding that she was not required to allege physical injury in order
to recover under the refund section of the DTPA, because a claim for
refund under section 17.50(b)(3) is inconsistent with a claim for physical
damages. 135
B. INCORPORATION OF THE DTPA INTO THE
TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
Numerous statutes incorporate various sections of the DTPA or permit
recovery for their violation via the DTPA.136 One of the most frequently
invoked of these "borrowing" statutes is Article 21.21 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code. 137 Stumph v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co.' 38 involved an insured
contractor who brought an action against his commercial general liability
insurer to recover for an underwriter's alleged misrepresentation that the
insured could continue sending premium payments to an independent
agent who had been suspended for failing to forward premiums. The trial
court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the insured but de-
nied a treble damage award. The parties appealed.
The Austin Court of Appeals examined the insurer's contention that
the evidence in the record was insufficient to prove an insurance viola-
tion.1 39 Regarding the DTPA and Insurance Code violations, the court
found that the evidence concerning the underwriter's conduct supported
the jury's finding that misrepresentations had been made. 140 The insured
had testified that the underwriter told him to continue paying premiums
to the agent, that the agent was a "good man," and that the underwriter
would contact the insured if there was a "problem."'1 41 Although the un-
derwriter denied making these statements, the jury evidently believed
otherwise. 142 The underwriter did not disclose the agent's recent suspen-
sion to the insured, and the insurer defended the nondisclosure as one of
133. Id. at 617.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing LSR Joint Venture No. 2 v. Callewart, 837 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1992, writ denied)).
136. Statutes either incorporating provisions of the DTPA or permitting recovery for
their violation via the DTPA include: TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 351.604, 702.403 (Vernon
Supp. 2001); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (Vernon 2000), § 2221.024 (Vernon 1995 &
Supp. 2001), §§ 221.071, 222.011, 59.005 (Vernon 1995); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 35.74(c) (Vernon 1987); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.013 (Vernon 2001);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2001); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4413(36), 5221a-7, 5221 a-8, 5221f, 9020; and TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 684.086
(Vernon 1999).
137. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2001).
138. 34 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).
139. Id. at 730-31.
140. Id.




its "sound business practices."' 43 The court found that the evidence was
sufficient to support the finding that the underwriter "failed to state a
material fact, made an untrue statement of material fact, or made a state-
ment in such a manner as to mislead a reasonably prudent person to a
false conclusion of a material fact."'144
C. UNCONSCIONABILITY
DTPA section 17.45(5) defines an "unconscionable action or course of
action" as "an act or practice which, to a consumer's detriment, takes
advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the
consumer to a grossly unfair degree."' 145
In Perry Homes v. Alwattari,146 the purchasers of a new home sued
their contractor for alleged DTPA violations in connection with defects in
the foundation. The contractor argued that the judgment awarding the
purchasers damages based upon a finding of unconscionable conduct
must be reversed because there was no evidence of gross disparity be-
tween the value of the house at the time of the purchase and the price
paid. 147 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals recognized that under the per-
tinent provisions of the DTPA in effect at the time the purchasers filed
suit, unconscionable conduct could be found based upon a gross disparity
allegation. 148 The court also noted that "disparity in value must be deter-
mined at the time of sale," and that "diminution in value caused by later
events cannot support an unconscionability claim."' 149 The real estate
agent testified that the house's actual value as a result of the foundation
defect was at least $50,000 less than the $200,335 that the purchasers had
paid. 150 Based upon this testimony, the court concluded that there was
legally sufficient evidence to establish gross disparity at the time of the
purchase. 151
D. CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE THE DTPA
In Laxson v. Giddens,152 the Waco Court of Appeals considered an
issue of first impression in Texas: whether a conspiracy to violate the
DTPA is actionable. 153 The court noted that a DTPA violation is per se
143. Stumph, 34 S.W.3d at 731.
144. Id.
145. Prior to the 1995 amendments, the definition also included an act or practice that
"results in a gross disparity between the value received and consideration paid, in a trans-
action involving transfer of consideration." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5)(B)
(Vernon 1987).
146. 33 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
147. Id. at 384.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 385 (citing Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 441 (Tex. 1995)).
150. Id.
151. Perry Homes, 33 S.W.3d at 385.
152. 48 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied).
153. Id. at 410.
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an unlawful act. 154 The court went on to state:
[tihere is no reason that when two or more persons agree to act to-
gether to violate the DTPA, they cannot each be held liable. Other-
wise two persons could agree to each violate a portion of the DTPA
for the express objective of deceiving a consumer but the consumer
may not have a claim unless the consumer combines the conspira-
tors' actions to show they acted together to achieve the objective
which violated the act.155
The court thus held that two or more persons can be held liable for
conspiring to violate the DTPA. 156
IV. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A prevailing plaintiff in a DTPA action may recover economic dam-
ages. 157 If the trier of fact finds that the defendant acted "knowingly,"
the plaintiff also may recover damages for mental anguish and additional
statutory damages up to three times the amount of economic damages. 158
A. DAMAGES
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. Partner-
ship,159 JMB, the purchaser of an office building, brought an action
against PPG Industries, Inc., a window manufacturer, alleging breach of
warranty and DTPA violations. JMB bought the building from Houston
Center Corp. in December 1989. In July 1994, after many of the windows
had fogged up and discolored, JMB sued PPG. The jury found in JMB's
favor on both its DTPA and breach of warranty claims and determined
that JMB had sustained approximately $5 million in damages. Electing
the greater remedy provided by the DTPA, the trial court awarded treble
damages under the 1973 version of the DTPA. Thus JMB was awarded
approximately $15 million in damages and prejudgment interest.
On appeal by PPG, the Houston Court of Appeals considered PPG's
contention that the 1989 statute, which provided for discretionary treb-
ling of damages, was the appropriate version to be applied by the court.
To determine which version of the statute applied, the court first re-
viewed the deceptive acts alleged by JMB. 160 Among those acts was the
original sale of defective window units, which occurred in 1976.161 The
court found that unless the 1979 or 1989 versions of the DTPA had retro-
active applicability, the 1973 version of the statute, providing for the
154. Id. at 411.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
158. Id.
159. 41 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. filed). See supra note
39 and accompanying text.




mandatory trebling of damages, applied.1 62 The court found that the
1979 amendment to the DTPA, which provided for discretionary trebling
of damages and which had prospective application only, did not apply to
JMB's claim relating to the original sale of the defective window units,
which occurred three years earlier.1 63 The court also found that although
the 1989 amendment applied to all actions commenced on or after the
effective date of the amendment, the 1973 amendment applied to JMB's
DTPA claim, given that the action related to property damage only, and
not to death or personal injury.164
In Perry Homes v. Alwattari,165 the purchasers of a new home sued
their contractor for alleged violations of the DTPA in connection with
defects in the foundation. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals disagreed
with the contractor's argument that the only proper measures of damages
for unconscionability were benefit-of-the-bargain or out-of pocket
losses. 166 "Under the DTPA in effect at the time [suit was filed], a pre-
vailing consumer could recover 'all actual' damages for economic loss
sustained by the consumer as a result of the deceptive trade practice,"
which "include[ed] diminution in market value occurring after re-
pairs."' 67 In addition, the court held that the plaintiff "need only present
sufficient evidence to justify a jury's finding that the costs were reasona-
ble and the repairs were necessary."'1 68
Stumph v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co. 169 involved an insured contractor
who brought an action against his commercial general liability insurer to
recover for an underwriter's alleged misrepresentation that the insured
could continue sending premium payments to an independent agent who
had been suspended for failing to forward premiums. The trial court en-
tered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the insured but denied a
treble damage award.
On appeal, the insured complained "that the district court should have
trebled actual damages after a finding by the jury of a "knowing" viola-
tion of the Insurance Code." °70 The court found that the 1994 version of
Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code was controlling.17' Under that ver-
sion, "[i]f the trier of fact finds that the defendant knowingly committed
the acts complained of, the court shall award, in addition, two times the
amount of actual damages.' 72 Because the jury found that the insurer
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. PPG Indus. Inc., 41 S.W.3d at 276.
165. 33 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). See supra note 137 and
accompanying text.
166. Id. at 386 (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992);
Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1985)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 385.
169. 34 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). See supra note 129 and accom-
panying text.
170. Id. at 732.
171. Id. at 732-33.
172. Id. at 733.
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knowingly engaged in a false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice that
was a producing cause of the damages to the insured, and because the
court affirmed the jury's answer by finding that more than a scintilla of
evidence that the insurer's conduct fit within the definition of "know-
ingly," the Austin court held that the trial court should have awarded
mandatory treble damages.173
B. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A consumer who prevails on a DTPA claim recovers reasonable and
necessary attorneys' fees. 174
In Buccaneer Homes of Alabama, Inc. v. Pelis,175 the owners of a mo-
bile home sued the manufacturer and retailer under the DTPA. After the
owners had settled with the retailer in an amount in excess of their eco-
nomic damages, the district court entered judgment on a jury verdict
against the manufacturer. The manufacturer appealed.
The Houston Court of Appeals considered the manufacturer's chal-
lenge to the trial court's award of $85,000 in attorney's fees to the owners
on the grounds that the award was improper because attorney's fees are
not recoverable unless economic damages are recovered.' 7 6 The court
found that, while "consumers may recover attorney's fees as a prevailing
party in a successful prosecution of a DTPA claim when an opposing
party's counterclaim recovery offsets the consumer's recovery, '177 the
rule "does not apply in a case in which a consumer has already settled for
an amount greater than the damages found by the jury in the trial against
the non-settling defendant.' 178 Although the owners won a jury verdict
in the trial court, the owner's damages were paid in full under the pre-
trial settlement agreement with the retailer and the one satisfaction
rule179 barred them from recovering economic damages. Thus, they
could not recover attorney's fees.180
V. DTPA DEFENSES AND EXEMPTIONS
The DTPA has been characterized as a "strict liability" statute, requir-
ing only proof of a misrepresentation, without regard to the offending
party's intent.' 8 ' This is only partially correct, since several DTPA provi-
173. Id.
174. DTPA § 17.50(d).
175. 43 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
176. Id. at 591.
177. Id. (citing McKinley v. Drozd, 685 S.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Tex. 1985)).
178. Id.
179. The one satisfaction rule prohibits a plaintiff from recovering twice for a single
injury. See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 390-91 (Tex. 2000) (limiting
plaintiffs to a single recovery for a single injury, even if different theories of liability are
alleged).
180. Pelis, 43 S.W.3d at 591.
181. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness P'ship v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture, 798
S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd).
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sions expressly require proof of intentional conduct. 182 Some courts have
gone so far as to hold that common law defenses, such as estoppel and
ratification, are not available to combat DTPA claims.183 Other courts
have recognized a variety of defenses to DTPA claims. 184 Additionally,
both the courts and the legislature have carved out exemptions from the
DTPA's reach.
A. A "MERE" BREACH OF CONTRACT IS NOT ACTIONABLE
UNDER THE DTPA
A breach of contract unaccompanied by a misrepresentation or fraud is
not a false, misleading or deceptive act and thus does not violate the
DTPA.185 During the Survey period, several cases examined this limita-
tion on the DTPA's reach.
In Canfield v. Bank One, Texas, N.A.,186 Canfield had sued his bank to
recover for wrongfully paid items, including forged checks and cashed-
out certificates of deposit. The Texarkana Court of Appeals found that
the bank's payment of forged checks did not constitute a violation of the
DTPA.
The court observed that in his breach of contract claim, Canfield al-
leged that his bank breached the deposit account agreement when it paid
the forged checks. 187 In his DTPA claims, Canfield alleged that the bank
"misrepresented the safety and security of deposited funds, safeguards to
prevent unauthorized withdrawals, and the attributes of the services it
offered."'188 The court found that Canfield's assertions amounted to
nothing more than a complaint that the bank did not comply with the
terms of the deposit account agreement and, if true, the bank's actions
that were contrary to its representations would result only in a breach of
contract claim.' 89
182. See, e.g., DTPA § 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16), (17) & (23).
183. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part, 891 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1998); see also Smith v.
Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (recognizing that a primary purpose of the DTPA
was to relieve consumers of common law defenses while providing a cause of action for
misrepresentation).
184. See, e.g., Ostrow v. United Bus. Machs., Inc., 982 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) ("We hold a DTPA claim arising out of a contract may be
barred by accord and satisfaction."); Johnson v. McLeaish, No. 05-94-01673-CV, 1995 WL
500308, at *10 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 23, 1995, writ denied) (not designated for publica-
tion) (applying illegality/public policy affirmative defense to DTPA claims); Keriotis v.
Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e)
(applying statute of frauds to DTPA claims).
185. Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Serv. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex.
1983); Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied).
186. 51 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied). See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.





B. LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASES AND THE DTPA
In Texas, legal malpractice is not the only cause of action under which a
client can recover from her attorney.190 The law, however, does not per-
mit a plaintiff to divide or fracture her legal malpractice claims into addi-
tional causes of action.191 In Goffney v. Rabson,192 the Houston Court of
Appeals agreed with the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's breach
of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and DTPA claims were essentially
legal malpractice claims, and because the plaintiff abandoned her legal
malpractice claim prior to trial, she no longer had a viable cause of action
upon which to recover. 193 With respect to her DTPA claim, the plaintiff
alleged that her attorney violated several laundry list provisions and en-
gaged in unconscionable courses of action. 194 The plaintiff contended
that because her DTPA claims were based on the lawyer's refusal to per-
form the parties' contract and his attempted withdrawal prior to the
plaintiff's hiring of new trial counsel, the claims were not related to the
quality of the lawyer's representation of her, and, therefore, were not
couched in terms of legal malpractice.' 95 The court disagreed, finding
that the plaintiff's claim that the lawyer's alleged abandonment of her on
the day of trial constituted a DTPA violation was merely a legal malprac-
tice claim, and that it did not matter that she labeled it as a DTPA
claim.196
The plaintiff further argued that the lawyer's alleged abandonment of
her on the day of trial constituted an unconscionable course of action
under the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Latham v. Castillo,197 which
recognized that an attorney might be found to have engaged in uncon-
scionable conduct in the manner in which the lawyer represents a client.
The court distinguished the Latham case from the instant case primarily
because, as the Latham court explained:
'[I]f the Castillos had only alleged that [the lawyer] negligently failed
to timely file their claim, their claim would properly be one for legal
malpractice. However, the Castillos alleged and presented some evi-
dence that [the lawyer] affirmatively misrepresented to them that he
had filed and was actively prosecuting their claim. It is the difference
between negligent conduct and deceptive conduct. To recast this
claim as one for legal malpractice is to ignore this distinction." 98
190. Kahlig v. Boyd, 980 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
191. See, e.g., Greathouse v. McConnell, 982 S.W.2d 165, 172 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); Kahlig, 980 S.W.2d at 688-91; Smith v. Heard, 980 S.W.2d 693, 697
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Rodriguez v. Klein, 960 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).
192. 56 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
193. Id. at 190.
194. Id. at 192.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 972 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1998).
198. 56 S.W.3d at 192 (citing Latham, 972 S.W.2d at 68).
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In Goffney, the Houston Court of Appeals found that it could not say
that the plaintiff's allegations of unconscionable conduct constituted the
type of alleged deceptive conduct that the Latham court distinguished
from negligent conduct to support a cause of action under the DTPA,
independent of a cause of action for legal malpractice. 199 Thus, the court
held that the plaintiff could not recover on her DTPA claim.
Mazuca v. Schumann200 posed another issue involving the attorney
conduct context. In the case, Schumann sued his attorney for "violations
of the DTPA, breach of warranty, negligence, and gross negligence, main-
taining that he was prevented from pursuing his personal injury claims
because the statute of limitations had run. '20 1 The lawyer argued that
Schumann's DTPA claim was, "in reality, a legal malpractice claim. '20 2
The San Antonio Court of Appeals examined whether the lawyer acted
unconscionably under the facts proven at trial relying, not only on the
statutory language of the DTPA, but also on the Texas Supreme Court's
language in Chastain v. Koonce,20 3 which stated that unconscionability
requires a showing that the resulting unfairness was "glaringly noticeable,
flagrant, complete, and unmitigated." 20 4 The court found that the law-
yer's act of filing a motion for nonsuit of a claim with sufficient time re-
maining under the statute of limitations to re-file the cause in a more
appropriate venue did not fit the Chastain definition of "unconsciona-
ble. '205 In addition, the court found that the lawyer's actions did not
amount to deceptive conduct required under Latham, as there was no
evidence that the lawyer "made an affirmative misrepresentation to his
client. '206 The court reversed the judgment awarding Schumann dam-
ages based on his DTPA claim and rendered judgment that Schumann
take nothing on his DTPA claims. 20 7
C. PREEMPTION AND EXEMPTION FROM THE DTPA
Several statutory schemes and common law doctrines bar DTPA
claims, either expressly or by implication, or affect a plaintiff's proce-
dures for bringing DTPA claims. During the Survey period, several cases
examined these limitations on the DTPA's reach.
1. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
Gomez v. Diaz20 8 involved medical malpractice claims, which are gov-
erned by the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, or
199. Id.
200. No. 04-00-00228-CV, 2001 WL 518300 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, May 16, 2001).
201. Id. at *2.
202. Id.
203. 700 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. 1985).
204. Id.
205. 2001 WL 518300, at *3.
206. Id.
207. Id. at *4.
208. 57 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
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MLIIA.20 9 The MLIIA is a special statutory scheme "designed to protect
health care providers from patently unmeritorious claims in order to en-
sure that their liability insurance costs remain manageable. '210 The
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals recognized that "Texas courts have con-
sistently held that causes of action that are, in actuality, health care liabil-
ity claims cannot simply be recast in the language of a different cause of
action in order to avoid application of the MLIIA. '' 211 Gomez brought
several DTPA causes of action against her doctor, complaining that the
doctor misrepresented the need for treatment and misrepresented that a
service had particular qualities.2 12 The court found that what Gomez was
really complaining about was a failure to properly treat her condition,
which is a negligence cause of action that falls squarely under the defini-
tion of health care liability claims and is governed by the MLIIA.2 13 The
court held that the plaintiff's DTPA causes of action that were not based
on knowing conduct were merely attempts to recast liability claims into
DTPA causes of action and must be governed by the MLIIA. 214
2. Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code
In Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.,215 discussed
in last year's Survey, the Texas Supreme Court held that the primary ju-
risdiction doctrine required that the trial court defer to the Texas Motor
Vehicle Board with regard to the plaintiff's DTPA claims. The Texas Mo-
tor Vehicle Commission Code216 was enacted to govern the distribution
and sale of motor vehicles "through licensing and regulating vehicle man-
ufacturers, distributors and dealers. ' '217 The Code provides that the
Texas Motor Vehicle Board ("TMVB") shall carry out the duties and
functions conferred upon it by the Code. If the TMVB determines that
the Code, or any TMVB rule or order, has been violated, it may levy a
civil penalty, issue cease and desist orders or injunctions, or institute a
lawsuit in the name of the State of Texas,218 but it may not award dam-
ages to parties.219
The court observed that the primary jurisdiction doctrine arises only
when a plaintiff seeks a remedy in court, and an issue or a claim also falls
under a regulatory scheme's subject matter.220 Consequently, the doc-
209. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. Art. 4590i, § 1.02 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2002).
210. 57 S.W.3d at 579.
211. Id. at 579-80 (citing Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. 1994)).
212. Id. at 580.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 779, No. 00-0292, 2001 WL 578337 (Tex. May 31, 2001, rehearing
granted).
216. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
217. David McDavid Nissan, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1999, pet. granted).
218. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.01-.03 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
219. See Kawasaki Motors Corp v. Tex. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 855 S.W.2d 792, 797
(Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
220. 2001 WL 578337, at *9.
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trine presumes concurrent jurisdiction over an issue exists between the
courts and the particular agency. 221 The court looked to the statutory
language, legislative intent, and public policies underlying the primary ju-
risdiction doctrine in reaching its conclusion that the Board had primary
jurisdiction to make any Code-violation findings that formed the basis of
the plaintiff's DTPA claims.222
3. The Texas Seed Arbitration Act
Last year's Survey covered the San Antonio Court of Appeal's decision
in Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins,22 3 which the Texas Supreme Court
examined during this period. The case concerns the relationship between
the DTPA and the Texas Seed Arbitration Act. The case involved a
group of farmers who sued Helena, a seed seller, alleging DTPA viola-
tions, breach of warranty, and fraud. The trial court entered judgment on
a jury verdict awarding damages to the farmers. Both sides appealed.22 4
Helena argued that if the Texas Seed Arbitration Act governed any part
of the suit, then all of the purchasers' claims must be arbitrated, regard-
less of the theory of recovery. Because the supreme court concluded that
the farmers "complied with the Act and held that their delay in submit-
ting their claims to arbitration did not bar their suit," the court deemed
that "determining whether the DTPA claims were within the Act's pur-
view" was unnecessary. 225
D. "As Is" CLAUSES
An "as is" agreement generally negates the causation element of a
DTPA claim.226 In Larsen v. Carlene Langford & Associates, Inc.,227 the
Waco Court of Appeals examined "as is" language found in documents
used in a real estate transaction involving the sale of a historic home. The
buyers alleged various laundry list violations. 228 Upon determining that
the "as is" language in the real estate documents was enforceable, the
Waco court concluded that the "as is" clauses conclusively negated reli-
ance, which was essential to recovery on all of the theories that the plain-
tiffs asserted. 229 Thus, the plaintiffs' agreement to buy the house "as is"
precluded a finding that the seller's conduct caused them any harm and
entitled the seller to summary judgment.230
221. Id. (citing Cash Am. Int'l Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 18 (Tex. 2000)).
222. Id. at *10.
223. 47 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2001). See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
224. Id. at 491.
225. Id. at 501.
226. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., 898 S.W.2d 156, 160-61 (Tex.
1995)).
227. 41 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied).
228. Id. at 250.




E. ASSIGNABILITY OF DTPA CLAIMS
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. Partner-
ship,231 the purchaser of an office building brought an action against PPG
Industries, a window manufacturer, alleging breach of warranty and vio-
lations of the DTPA. JMB bought the building from Houston Center
Corp. in December 1989. In July 1994, after many of the windows had
fogged up and discolored, JMB sued PPG. The jury found in JMB's favor
on both its DTPA and breach of warranty claims.232
On appeal, the Houston Court of Appeals examined PPG's contention
that JMB was not a consumer. PPG argued that JMB could not assert a
DTPA cause of action against PPG because, under JMB's purchase con-
tract with the original owner, JMB acquired no DTPA claims. Although
under the DTPA, the original owner was a "consumer," PPG contended
that, JMB was not a "consumer" in its own right and a cause of action
under the DTPA is a personal punitive right that cannot be assigned.233
The court recognized the split of authority on the issue, but noted that
"several courts of appeals have either found, or assumed, that DTPA
claims are assignable. '234 The court also noted that assignability of a
DTPA cause of action is in accord with the legislature's purpose in enact-
ing the DTPA. Additionally, the court found it helpful to view the
survivability of an action to help determine its assignability. Such an in-
quiry is beneficial because in Texas, at common law, if an action survives
the death of a claimant, the cause of action is assignable. 235 "While lower
courts have differed in their holdings, the Texas Supreme Court has re-
served the issue of the survivability of a DTPA cause of action. ' 236 Be-
cause the DTPA claims asserted by JMB were in the nature of claims for
breach of express warranty, and because courts have found breach of
warranty claims and injury to property claims assignable, the court found
that the DTPA claims in the case were assignable.237 "Thus, whatever
DTPA claims Houston Center Corp., the original owner, had against PPG
were assigned to JMB when JMB acquired the building in 1989."238
F. AGENCY AND THE DTPA
In Keyser v. Miller,239 several landowners sued Keyser, among others,
231. 41 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
232. Id. at 275-76.
233. Id.
234. Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 610 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hart v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 727 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1987, no writ); Rosell v. Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.2d 278, 279
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ)).
235. Id. (citing Harding v. State Nat'l Bank of El Paso, 387 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1965, no writ)).
236. PPG Indus. Inc., 41 S.W.3d at 275-76 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Chapman, 682 S.W.2d
257, 259 (Tex. 1984)).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 47 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
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for misrepresentations in connection with their purchase of oversized lots
in a Pearland, Texas subdivision. The landowners claimed that Keyser
represented to them that they could "fence their entire back yard despite
the existence of an easement. '240 Keyser contended that he was not indi-
vidually liable under the DTPA as a matter of law because he acted solely
as a corporate agent of his employer, The Homemaker. 241 The Houston
Court of Appeals sustained Keyser's point of error, because the jury's
findings did not support a judgment against Keyser individually.
The court recognized that a "corporate agent can be liable for his own
torts, even if he is acting as an agent. '2 42 The question before the court,
however, was "when does an agent become individually liable for viola-
tions of the DTPA?' '243 The court noted that the jury found that "Keyser
acted solely within the course and scope of his employment with, or as an
agent for, The Homemaker. '244 Thus, although the jury found that
Keyser made actionable misrepresentations, it did not find that he indi-
vidually violated the DTPA, a finding that had been necessary under
prior Texas Supreme Court decisions.2 45 The court noted that the parties
had brought no case to its attention in which an "individual who was not
an officer or director of a company, and who acted solely within the scope
of his employment or agency and without the intent to deceive, was found
personally liable under the DTPA. ' 2 46 The court noted that its holding
did not "preclude a finding of individual liability against employees in all
cases-it only requires a finding that the employee acted in his individual
capacity in violating the DTPA. '' 247 The court stated that if it accepted
the appellees' position in the case, "every case against a corporation will
involve potential DTPA liability for the individual who spoke the words
that constituted the misrepresentation, even though the corporation au-
thorized him to make the representation, even though he was not an of-
ficer or director of the corporation but was the lowest employee, and
even though he did not know the representation was false. '248 Thus, af-
ter extensive analysis, the court concluded that the personal judgment
against Keyser, in the absence of any finding that he acted knowingly and
in the presence of findings that he acted solely in his capacity as an em-
ployee or agent of The Homemaker and that he did not commit fraud,
was error.
249
240. Id. at 729.
241. Id.
242. Id. (citing Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996)).
243. Id. at 730.
244. Id. at 731.
245. Keyser, 47 S.W.3d at 731.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 733.





Under the DTPA's limitations provision, an action must be com-
menced within two years after the date on which the false, misleading or
deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after the consumer
discovered, or should have discovered, the occurrence of the false, mis-
leading or deceptive act or practice. 250
In Underkofler v. Vanasek,251 the Texas Supreme Court reversed the
Dallas Court of Appeals' holding that the limitations tolling rule the su-
preme court adopted in Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins25 2 applied to the
plaintiff's DTPA claims.25 3 In Hughes, the supreme court "announce[d] a
new rule tolling limitations until all appeals of the underlying claim are
exhausted when an attorney allegedly commits malpractice while provid-
ing legal services in the prosecution or defense of a claim which results in
litigation. ' 254 The Underkofler court noted that the "Legislature has
adopted a specific statute of limitations for DTPA claims, and has in-
cluded only two exceptions to the general rule that limitations begins to
run on the date the wrongful act occurred: a discovery rule and a fraudu-
lent concealment rule. '255 The supreme court deferred to the Legisla-
ture's explicit policy determination that those are the only two exceptions
to the DTPA statute of limitations and the court refused to rewrite the
statute to add the Hughes tolling rule as a third.25 6 The supreme court
overruled Aduddell v. Parkhill,257 which was issued the same day as
Hughes. Due to the brevity of the analysis in Aduddell, and the supreme
court's conclusion that the Legislature circumscribed the exceptions to
limitations for DTPA claims, the court overruled Aduddell to the extent it
applied Hughes to DTPA claims.25 8
VI. CLASS ACTIONS
Peltier Enterprises, Inc. v. Hilton259 was a class action lawsuit in which a
putative class of car buyers sued a car dealership, and several banks, al-
leging fraudulent concealment, DTPA violations of unconscionability and
failure to disclose, and tortious interference with a potential contract.
The complaints were based on the dealership's admitted practice of sell-
ing a car, providing financing, and "shopping" the paper to financial insti-
tutions, one of which purchases the paper at a discount. In other words,
the consumer was offered a particular rate of interest but the financial
institution charged a lower rate of interest, with the difference going to
250. DTPA § 17.565.
251. 53 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. 2001).
252. 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991).
253. Underkofler, 53 S.W.3d at 346.
254. Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 159.
255. Underkofler, 53 S.W.2d at 346.
256. Id.
257. Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 158.
258. Underkofler, 53 S.W.2d at 346-47.
259. 51 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied).
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the dealer. The payment was called a "dealer participation fee," and the
consumer was never told about the money that goes to the dealer or
about the bank's lower interest rate.260
The dealer maintained that its practice was in strict compliance with
the Texas Finance Code. The car buyers, however, contended that the
"dealer participation fee" was actually a kickback to the dealer for giving
the bank its financing business.
After a trial on the merits of several claims asserted by two class repre-
sentatives, the jury found for the banks and the dealership. However, the
trial court refused to render judgment on the verdict and certified a class
action. The bank and the dealer field an interlocutory appeal challenging
class certification.
In reviewing the causes of action brought by the car buyers against the
bank and the dealer, the court concluded that the "resolution of individ-
ual issues was likely to be an overwhelming and unmanageable task for a
single jury."'261 As for the car buyers' unconscionability claim, the court
noted that there must be a showing of what the consumer could have or
would have done if he had known about the dealer participation fee.262
"For example, if the consumer could not get financing through any other
source and still wanted the car, he might have purchased it under the
retail installment contract as written even if told of the transaction with
the bank. '263 Or if the difference in payments was very small, the con-
sumer might not have cared at all.264 There would also need to be some
showing of each customer's "knowledge, ability, experience, or capac-
ity.' 265 The court opined that a plaintiff with knowledge about indirect
lending or with years of experience in the car selling business would not
be able to show that the dealer did anything "unconscionable. '266
The car buyers also brought a "failure to disclose" claim under DTPA
section 17.46(b)(23). 267 The court observed that this claim requires indi-
vidualized proof because reliance is an essential element of the claim.268
Again, the question remained as to what each class member could or
would have done if he or she had known of the transaction between the
dealer and the bank.269 The court stated that "it was not possible that
any one individual's evidence on this point could be substituted for
another's." 270
260. Id. at 619-20.
261. Id. at 624.
262. Id. at 623.
263. Id. at 623-24.





269. Peltier, 51 S.W.3d at 624.
270. Id. (citing Life Ins. Co. of the Southwest v. Brister, 722 S.W.2d 764, 774 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ)).
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The Tyler court held that "because of the numerous fact issues raised
by the pleadings, which could only be determined by questioning each
individual plaintiff, the common issues did not predominate over ques-
tions affecting only individual class members. '271 Accordingly, the Tyler
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's certification of the class.
VII. CONCLUSION
This year's DTPA cases exhibit a continuation of trends perceived in
previous Surveys. Of the twenty-four opinions selected this year for dis-
cussion, only four involved traditional consumer goods (two involved au-
tomobiles, one involved a motorhome and one involved
pharmaceuticals). Seven cases involved real estate-related disputes (ei-
ther the purchase of real estate interests or disputes involving construc-
tion materials). Professional and financial services continue to dominate
the reported decisions; of the ten cases in this category, four involved
banking or other financial services, one involved insurance and five in-
volved claims of lawyer or physician malpractice. At least among the re-
ported decisions, "traditional" consumer disputes remain the exception
rather than the rule.
This year's cases also confirm that threshold issues concerning the
DTPA's proper scope continue to command significant judicial atten-
tion-albeit not always with consistent results. While decisions such as
Burnap272 suggest that it is the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction,
rather than his relationship to the defendant, that is of primary signifi-
cance when determining DTPA standing, the Codner273 decision demon-
strates that privity is not altogether irrelevant to the task of measuring
the DTPA's reach. The court's opinion in Anton274 demonstrates that it
is important to go beyond the simple question of whether goods or ser-
vices are involved in the disputed transaction, and to ask whether some
problem with those goods or services actually forms the basis of the plain-
tiff's complaint. In contrast, the Laxson275 court's holding that deficien-
cies in a putative DTPA plaintiff's case may be elided by characterizing
the defendants' conduct as a "conspiracy" to violate the DTPA promises
to inject additional uncertainty into the already vexing task of outlining
the proper contours of the statute's reach.
Like past surveys, the current crop of cases suggests that it is the multi-
valent nature of the inquiry into consumer status that continues to con-
found judicial efforts to rationalize DTPA standing. As we have
271. Id.
272. 38 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
273. 40 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.). See supra note 119.
274. 36 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied). See supra note 56 and ac-
companying text.




previously suggested,2 76 attempts to render standing with simplistic for-
mulae rarely contribute to illumination of the relevant issues. The salient
inquiry remains whether conferring DTPA standing on a particular con-
sumer would further the statutory goal of leveling the playing field be-
tween merchants and their customers, or would serve as a sword, rather
than as a shield, in the resolution of commercial disputes.2 77
276. See 53 SMU L. REV. 865, 897 (Summer 2000).
277. See 54 SMU L. REV. 1269, 1305 (Summer 2001).
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